In the applications for mobile sensing, the trustworthy of sensed data should be put on the first place. The identification of participants can ensure data trustworthy but will reveal the privacy of the participants to a great extent. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving identification mechanism for mobile sensing systems to select sensed data dynamically to protect participant's sensitive information. It solves the contradiction between ''privacy protection'' and ''identification''. It divides data privacy sensitivity of the data sensed from the task that participants attended, allowing participants to define their own privacy sensitivity, then selects sensed data dynamically and uses differential privacy to process the data with high privacy sensitivity. It can not only protect participants' privacy, but also identify participants' IDs. In order to achieve identification, a two-layer neural network model is used to train and learn the participant's style of action and generate an identity feature database. The experimental results show that the proposed mechanism can provide a trustworthy platform for mobile sensing systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of wireless communication and sensor technology, mobile terminals such as smart phones, tablet PCs, wearable devices, and on-board sensing devices on the market have contributed to the applications in a variety of domains. And many works have been researched, developed, and deployed to combine trusted computing technologies with mobile sensing [1] . Mobile sensing paradigms, such as participatory sensing [2] , empower ordinary users to contribute data sensed by their mobile devices and then complete large-scale, complex social perception tasks with the collected data, providing enormous social and technical benefits. In trusted computing systems, authentication is an important component. And in mobile sensing systems, guaranteeing the trustworthy of sensed data is crucial.
However, several device-owners' privacy concerns arise [3] . For mobile sensing systems, participants' personal credibility is difficult to assess if they are anonymous: the content may come from one who does not have a reputation. And the participatory sensing systems require users to present the authentic perceived data the first time they contribute and without forcing them to reveal any sensitive information about themselves. Then in order to confirm the reliability of the source of perceived data later, the server only needs to analyze the perceived data to obtain some information about behavioral characteristics to match a corresponding account of participant without the need to know the specific identity information about the participants [4] . However, the data that participants provided is related to personal information, sensitive object information, real-time location information, etc. Attackers can use these perceptual data to speculate the participants' real information, economic condition, and health condition and so on. In this paper, identification refers to matching a corresponding account of a participant, not the need to get specific identity of the participant.
Therefore, the design of a mobile sensing application confronts two challenges: ''privacy protection'' and ''identification'' [5] . On one hand, to make the social perception tasks successfully completed, a mobile sensing system requires the identification of a group of participants efficiently [4] . It requires relevant sensed data to determine the identities of the participants. These sensed data will inevitably leak the privacy of the participants. On the other hand, participants worry about their privacy. If the system cannot ensure participants' privacy, they will provide the data less associated with themselves. If the system provides full anonymity to participants for privacy-preserving consideration, it is impossible to authenticate their identities. No matter which one cannot make sure the effectiveness of the tasks.
This paper proposes a privacy-preserving identification mechanism that utilizes differential privacy to protect participants' sensitive information while ensuring that the server can authenticate the participants' identities. As a matter of fact, a participant's sensitive information may be unimportant for the other. In other words, the sensitivity of each one's privacy varies person to person. Based on this point, we divide the privacy sensitivity of the sensed data, allowing participants to define their own privacy sensitivity. We design an algorithm to determine the amount of data selected for each time period, which can be a reference. We also screen out the data with higher privacy sensitivity of attributes than the user's defined privacy sensitivity in the sensed data, using differential privacy to protect this part of data. For the rest part of data which has the lower privacy sensitivity than the user's privacy sensitivity, we just do some simple data processing. All of the work is aimed at each single user. Although differential privacy makes data completely different from the original one, the results of analyzing the data are the same in the error range. Thus the server can still analyze the data and identify user's ID. In this paper, we design a two-layer of neural network model using the data processed by differential privacy to recognize identify and apply it to a driver identification system and prove the feasibility.
In conclusion, the main contributions of our work include:
• An algorithm is proposed to divide data privacy sensitivity and set specific levels to quantify the sensitivity of privacy and assess the degree of privacy leaking.
• An adaptive privacy-preserving strategy via differential privacy is designed to protect participants' data with high sensitivity of privacy.
• A driver identification system using the data protected by differential privacy is implemented to identify the drivers. The result shows that driver identification model has satisfactory accuracy without personal privacy leakage.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss some related work. Section III presents the details design of main modules in the mechanism. In Section IV, we analysis the security and evaluate the performance of the mechanism. And the conclusion is made in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Many works have been down to research trusted computing technologies for mobile devices. Asokan et al. made a survey of efforts in designing and deploying trusted computing solutions, especially in the context of mobile systems.
They pointed out that many works research hardwarebased trusted execution environments (TEEs) to meet privacy and security requirements [1] . Wang et al. [6] propose ARTSense, a framework to solve the problem of ''trust without identity'' in mobile sensing systems. It consists of a privacy-preserving provenance model, a data trust assessment scheme and an anonymous reputation management protocol just to achieve anonymity and security. Gilbert et al. [7] propose a trustworthy mobile sensing platform which leverages inexpensive commodity Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware to balance data integrity and device-owners' privacy. Dua et al. [8] propose a novel trusted platform module that addresses the problem of providing sensor data integrity.
Participatory sensing with mobile devices benefits from trustworthy and credible data. Participants forward their location information to a service provider, which coordinates interactions among participants based on the locations it receives. And location information may reveal our sensitive information. Many works have done to protect location privacy. Yang et al. [4] analyzed several critical security and privacy challenges in mobile sensing. Toch [9] study how crowdsourcing can be used to predict the user's privacy preferences for different locations on the basis of the general user population and present a crowdsourcing framework for privacy management of location information in ubiquitous environment. To et al. [10] introduce a framework for protecting location privacy of workers participating in spatial crowdsourcing tasks. Zhao et al. [11] use machine learning to predict people's privacy preferences and provide people with recommendations of appropriate location privacy settings. These are means to protect the location privacy of users. However, crowdsourcing tasks often collect the data of other attributes while collecting the location information. Other privacy such as time, temperature may be exposed [4] . To fully protect the privacy of users, some work provide anonymity for participants in the tasks [12] . Their aim is to allow users to earn credits by contributing data without leaking which data they have contributed. A large number of experiments showed that differential privacy is a flexible privacy protection method with a solid mathematical theory to support. It has a wide range of application prospects. Differential privacy protection model is a privacy model based on data distortion. k-anonymity and l-diversity are two representative and widely used privacy protection methods based on restricted publishing generalization techniques [14] , [15] . In 2006, Dwork [16] first proposed the differential privacy protection model. In recent years, the differential privacy protection model has been widely applied to the fields of Privacy Protection Data Release (PPDR) and Privacy Protection Data Mining (PPDM) [17] . It has great development prospect.
Differential privacy is a meaningful and mathematically rigorous definition of privacy useful for quantifying and bounding privacy loss [18] . Developed in the context of statistical disclosure control -providing accurate statistical information about a set of respondents while protecting the privacy of each individual -the concept applies more generally to any private data set for which it is desirable to release coarse-grained information while keeping private the details. In 2014, Dwork and Roth [19] do a lot of research about the existing differential privacy algorithm model and present a thorough introduction to the problems and techniques of differential privacy.
A great amount of researches has done on differential privacy. Cormode et al. [20] solve the problem that the noise added in the sparse data is too large in the process of differential privacy protection by simplifying the steps and reducing the sensitivity, so that the application of differential privacy protection in sparse data has better effects. In [21] , it shows a synergy between differential privacy and k -anonymity that improves the utility of differentially private responses to arbitrary queries about published data sets. Dwork and Rothblum [22] also proposed Concentrated Differential Privacy, a relaxation of Differential Privacy enjoying better accuracy than both pure differential privacy without compromising on cumulative privacy loss over multiple computations. Zhang et al. [23] first propose a battery-based differential privacy-preserving (BDP) scheme to achieve differential privacy and cost saving simultaneously. And for mobile sensing, Kairouz et al. [24] have researched local differential privacy in order to preventing attacks from untrustworthy data collectors. Wang et al. [25] propose a location privacy-preserving task allocation framework with geo-obfuscation to protect users' locations. They make participants obfuscate their reported locations under the guarantee of differential privacy to provide privacy protection. Our paper shows that differential privacy can obfuscate users' other privacy further. Some researchers deal with the noise to provide a well-balanced tradeoff between privacy and service accuracy. Andrés et al. [26] presents a mechanism called geoind to achieve location protection by adding controlled random noise to the user's location [26] . Dewri [27] demonstrate how perturbationbased mechanisms. Differential privacy of the final result is achieved by distributed Laplace perturbation mechanism (DLPA). Goryczka et al. [28] with others introduce a new efficient distributed noise generation scheme with partial noise drawn from Laplace distributions. Our work deal with the changeable part of sensed data to reduce the difference between the processed data and the original data. Such confusion can ensure the accuracy of later work of identification.
III. DETAIL DESIGN
In this section, we propose a privacy-preserving identification mechanism, which is a dynamic balance regulatory mechanism. It can not only protect the privacy of participants through differential privacy, but also identify participants' identities to ensure the trustworthy and reliability of the data. The three purposes of the privacy-preserving identification mechanism are: 1) to divide the levels of privacy sensitivity; 2) to protect participants' privacy dynamically; 3) to identify participants' IDs.
A. PRIVACY SENSITIVITY LEVEL DIVISION
In order to realize protecting participants' privacy dynamically, the first step is to realize the division of the privacy sensitivity, dividing dataset into different privacy sensitivity levels. We design the module of privacy sensitivity level division.
This module is one of the core security modules of the system. Its function is to store the data in the local database sensed by different kinds of sensors in the mobile sensing device and divide the privacy sensitivity levels for the dataset. The sensed data is mainly dynamic. It constantly changes and accumulates during the continuous progress of the task, including the user's location information, movement, time, speed, temperature, service requests and so on. And the possibility to find out the user's identity information is likely to increase, in other words, the degree of privacy leaking continues to increase.
As a matter of fact, a participant's sensitive information may be unimportant for others. In other words, the sensitivity of each one's privacy varies from person to person. Based on this point, we divide the privacy sensitivity levels of the sensed data.
In this module, the local client has two basic databases. One stores all the original data collected, and the other stores the user-selected data and the data later will be uploaded to the server. The module divides the data privacy sensitivity and conducts the first round of assessment to quantify the degree of data privacy leaking and feedback the result to the users. Users can select the whole dataset or just a part of it, which will be mentioned in the part of Local differential privacy-data processing. We calculate the user's privacy sensitivity, and then make a record in the local client.
According to the privacy sensitivity of a user, system first determines a threshold T , which is generally unchanged during the task unless the user changes it by himself. Then system will analyze and divides the privacy sensitivity of data with different attributes into m levels.
Each user has a different degree of tolerance of privacy leaking. For the data with some attributes, the user does not want it to be known by others. So the privacy sensitivity of these attributes of data is high. For some attributes, it doesn't matter whether it is obtained by others. Different attributes distinguished are based on which sensor they are sensed by. TABLE I lists several attributes and the sensors they are corresponding to, but not the whole.
The privacy sensitivity of the data with different attributes can be divided into m levels, with the specific value 0, 1, 2 . . . m − 1. User can select a specific value that corresponds to a certain attribute j as Sj.
The privacy sensitivity of this data with a specific attribute j is defined as Sj_degree:
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In this situation, the higher the value is, the higher privacy sensitivity is defined. The specific data j belongs to the level Sj determined by users. Based on the participants' own privacy sensitivity, they can select sensed data during each task cycle and upload.
B. LOCAL DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY-DATA PROCESSING
The whole process of privacy-data processing works on the local client too. User selects the data and it is processed via differential privacy. In this module, we analyze the degree of privacy disclosure of the collected data on the local client and feed it back to the participants. Let the participants select the amount of data to up load later to the server.
After a participant determines his privacy sensitivity and accepts the task, the task starts. First, we divide the time assigned to the task into n equal parts, that is, the total time of the task are divided into n time intervals as t 1 , t 2 . . . t n . In the first task cycle t 1 during the task, we store the sensed data in the database which stores all the data collected as the basic dataset and analyze the attributes of the data in this dataset according to different sensors in the TABLE I . Make a record on these attributes and associate them with the privacy sensitivities determined by the participant so that the privacy sensitivity of the data can be quickly calculated during the subsequent tasks. The kinds of these attributes recorded as p. The server studies the regularity of the amount of sensed data and its attributes in every cycle. Then it predicts the amount of data in the next cycles. The predict method is as follows:
Define the total amount of sensed data for the dataset of the previous k cycles during the task is:
where N (t k ) is the amount of sensed data in the cycle t k . Define the total amount of selected data for the dataset of the previous k cycles during the task is:
where M (t k ) is the amount of selected data in the cycle t k .
In the task cycle t k. , all the sensed data stores in the original database at first. Then calculate the whole privacy sensitivity in this task cycle t k is:
where Ni is the amount of data with attribute i appears in the task cycle t k . Similarly, the privacy sensitivity of the selected data in this task cycle t k. is:
where Mi is the amount of data with attribute i appears in the selected data. At the end of every cycle, participants can check the whole privacy sensitivity N_Sen k in this cycle. Then based on his own tolerance for privacy disclosure, he selects a certain percentage of data in this part of the data. Check the privacy sensitivity M_Sen k of the selected data. If the privacy sensitivity M_Sen k cannot satisfy participant, he can modify. As the amount of data increases, the amount of data associated with the participant increases and the privacy leakage level of the participant increases. The local client keeps track of the synchronization.
If the privacy sensitivity of all the selected data is more than threshold T , the system will immediately alert user.
Here the formula (7) is used to control the amount of data that the participant should select in the next few cycles.
where q is a control factor that satisfies normal distribution.
where σ is large, so q can be very small and smoothly changed. The formula shows a reference and controls the privacy sensitivity of all the selected data very close but is always below the threshold T .
Suppose that at the end of task cycle t k , the amount of selected is M (t k ). The privacy sensitivity of all the selected data is
and Sen k is close to threshold T . In the rest cycles t k+1 , t k+2 , . . . , t n , take the average
as a reference of the amount of data that the participant should select. Here M (t i ) is the amount of data predicted in the next task cycle t i .
The dynamic selection of data largely controls the privacy sensitivity of the selected data to the threshold T. However, the above data selection is only a rough control of the privacy sensitivity of data but does not mean the effectiveness protection of the privacy. In order to increase the possibility of privacy protection, we use differential privacy to process the selected data further. The data to be processed is those with high privacy sensitivity of attributes.
Differential privacy is a privacy protection technology based on data distortion. It adds a random noise to distort the protected dataset while keeping some data attributes and the results of processing unchanged. It ensures that adding or deleting a piece of data in a data set has little effect on the final data query results. Even in the worst case, an attacker knows all the data except one record, it can guarantee the sensitive information for that record will not be leaked.
However, if applying differential privacy protection to the overall data set through adding noise will inevitably lead to large amounts of data loss. It not only fail to identify the IDs of the users, but also fail to guaranty the task to be completed effectively. In our system, we only add noise to disturb the data with high privacy sensitivity of attributes. It reduces the amount of data processed, the degree of loss of data information and achieve the purpose of privacy protection.
The definitions of differential privacy are as follows [21] : 
The parameter ε is called the budget of privacy protection. It allows us to control the level of privacy. Note that the added noise depends in this case only on the privacy parameter ε. Lower values of ε mean stronger privacy, as they limit further the influence of a record on the outcome of a calculation. In practical applications, ε usually takes a small value. Differential privacy has two mechanisms. Since the Laplace mechanism is only applicable to numerical query results, however, in many practical applications, the query results for the entity object. The way to obtain differential privacy to meet the need of non-numerical query results is through the exponential mechanism. The exponential mechanism is given a quality function q that scores outcomes of a calculation, where higher scores are better. For a given database and ε parameter, the quality function induces a probability distribution over the output domain, from which the exponential mechanism samples the outcome. This probability distribution favors high scoring outcomes (they are exponentially more likely to be chosen), while ensuring ε-differential privacy.
Definition 2: Let f : (D n × R) → R k be a quality function that, given a database d ∈ D n , assigns a score to each outcome r ∈ Range.
Let M be a mechanism for choosing an outcome r ∈ Range given a database instance d ∈ D n . Then the mechanismM , defined by
maintains ε-differential privacy.
In our system, we apply exponential mechanism and add the noise to the data of high privacy sensitivity levels and the function f is the total amount of data with each attribute. The choice of privacy parameter ε determines the size of added noise, which determines the degree of privacy preserving and data quality. The server will first select a specific value of ε and assess the degree of privacy protection. Then the server feedback the result and modify the value of the parameter until it reaches the target effect. The process of assessing the degree of privacy protection and feeding the result back is described in detail in the part of Privacy assessment of processed data.
Select datasets D with high privacy sensitivity of attributes in the whole data uploaded to the server. Datasets D is the result of adding noise to the datasets D. Assess the degree of privacy protection T and compare the result with participant M 's privacy sensitivity T . If the result is higher than T , find a smaller value to ε and make the noise bigger. Continue to assess the degree of privacy protection T and compare it with T . If the result is smaller than T , find a bigger ε. Repeat the process above, until the error signal e = T − T < 0.01 and use the ε to process datasets D.
At the end of every task cycle t k , local client uploads the processed data to the server for identification and complete perception tasks.
C. IDENTIFICATION
To achieve the purpose of identification, firstly, we preprocess the uploaded data, which includes Kalman filtering, coordinate calibration and data standardization. After preprocessing, we authenticate the basic action in every moment of the vehicle using the simple threshold judgment methods. Then we divide the trip (a sequence of basic action) with the 50% overlapped sliding window, which length is l. The statistic features will be extracted from each segment. We extract statistics features including: mean, variance, standard deviation, min, max, root mean square (RMS) the area of signal amplitude (SMA) and mean delta, which is the average of delta x(t n ) = x(t n ) − x(t n − 1), as formula (14) shows:
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where the X i means the ith data in the segment. And the area of signal amplitude is calculated as formula (15):
Besides, we further extract features consist of the sum of the negative values, sum of the positive values, the number of the minimum, the number of the maxima, the area of signal amplitude. The features mentioned all above are extracted from each raw data segment, in which contains 3 axes of the orientation sensor, gyroscope and accelerometer, 9 axes in total (9 * 12 = 108 features). Moreover, we will also take the correlation coefficient between these 9 axes into consideration (9 * 8/2 = 36 features). The formula of correlation coefficient between the axes is:
where ρ AB is the correlation coefficient between axes A and B, a i and b i are the ith data in axis A and B, and n is the number of data in the sliding window segment. The sum of all the features extracted above is 108 + 36 = 144. When choosing the classifier to authenticate the user's identity according to their data, we do the survey and research on plenty of papers, and do some experiments to compare several common classifiers in the machine learning field, such as support vector machine (SVM), random forest, k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) and artificial neural network (ANN). As conclusion, the ANN classification algorithm usually performs better than the other machine learning model under the same condition. Thus, we intend to construct an artificial neural network for identification.
Inspired by CNN+RNN model in machine learning field [29] , we design a two-layer artificial neural network model, which is aimed at solving user identification problem. However, different from the CNN theory, we extract features manually instead of the convolution kernel. Besides, we use the consecutive sequence of the segments divided by the sliding windows as the basic input of the neural network model to replace the effect of RNN, which in fact is the local perception layer. FIGURE 1 shows the main architecture of our neural network model, which consists of global perception layer and local perception layer. The local perception layer contains a serial of neural network units, and each unit receives inputs of features which are extracted from the segment, and these segments are a sequence which is in the chronological order, similar to the theory of RNN. The input features will be trained separately in the unit to learn the characteristics of the driver. Moreover, the global perception layer can get driving characteristics in plenty number of segments, which will make the learning more effectively. The inputs in the global perception layer are the outputs of the local perception layer from all the units, which are the driving features of each scene. And the hidden layers of global perception layer will train these features from local perception layer and the output layer will make prediction. During identifying, the test set is input into each user's training neural network model to find out whether the user is the same person in record or not. This is a two-category supervised machine learning algorithm, which is similar to fingerprint identification.
When implementing the model, we choose the Sigmoid activation function and the back propagation (BP) learning algorithm, which is the supervised learning algorithm. The learning rate is learning_rate=0.2 and the maximum of iterations is epochs =10000. The hidden layer number for local perception is 2 and the hidden layer number for global perception is 4.
D. PRIVACY ASSESSMENT OF PROCESSED DATA
At this part, the system stands at the an attacker's point of view, analyzing processed data and getting the single users' privacy disclosure, in order to determine the appropriateness of the selected parameter ε. Suppose an attacker has mastered the largest background knowledge in addition to the required privacy. This part uses linear regression algorithm and all the parameters are obtained based on the collected data in the previous time regions. If the volume of mix zone is V and the server can select the source of information by random name, we can easily see that the probability of a participant to be selected is:
As it is shown, if the volume of mix zone is large, the probability of a participant to be selected will be small.
When new participants accept new tasks, the volume of mix zone will be added and new participants will upload new data. The difference T between the generation time T 1 of the next data and the new participants connection time T 2 is also a parameter to be considered.
The total time a participant stay in the mix zone is also an important factor to be considered. The amount of data is has positive correlation with the total online time. The online time D(M ) of a participant M is also considered within the range of consideration. If T 3 (M ) is the login time of the participant M and T Now is the current time, we can see
So the probability of knowing a participant's account is
When implementing the model, we choose the samples in the field test, and the actual output value is U t . Compare U t with the desired output value Y and the error signal is e. Then use the weight adjustment mechanism according to the error e to modify the learning system of the weight coefficient, to make the error e smaller and smaller, finally achieve the direction that error e < 0.0001. Then the actual output value U t and the expected output value Y is almost the same. If Y = 1, the U t will be the degree of anonymous:
After the training is completed, we can get the output U e . At this time U e (M ) is the probability of knowing the participant M 's account during the transaction.
For each source of data, we set it a series of exposure rules R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n according to the specific attributes of data. For each rule R i , it also contains a set of exposure weights W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W n . The output is:
Similarly, training error signal e to e < 0.0001. For different rule R i , the total output signal U R is:
Similarly, training error signal e to e < 0.0001. Then U e U R is the probability of finding out that the participant's account corresponds to the certain uploaded data.
For every cycle, a participant choose a part of data to be processed and finally upload to the server. The ratio of the selected data to the original sensed data of each attribute j is M (j)/N (j).
According to the specific value of privacy parameter ε, add noise to each datasets D of the same attribute j and get datasets D . The ratio of the processed data to the original sensed data of each attribute j is:
A participant's tolerance for privacy disclosure is:
where N j is the amount of processed data with the same attribute j. The probability of the final participant M 's privacy leaking is:
Feedback the result of participant's tolerance for privacy disclosure U Q to compare it with participant M 's privacy sensitivity and adjust parameter ε to target result.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In the privacy-preserving identification mechanism, some of the data with privacy sensitivity exceeding threshold T are protected. The processed data is only a part of the total dataset. This can effectively solve the above two problems, greatly reducing the amount of data loss and the reduction of quality, making the final tasks less affected.
We apply this mechanism to a mobile sensing system for the sensing task of driving behavior and driver identification. To verify the effectiveness and accuracy of our privacy protection and identification module in a driver identification system, we implement the system and do the necessary experiment. The app on the Android smart phone is mainly responsible for data collection. The data are saved as * .csv file, which is rather convenient to process on different platforms.
We invited 30 volunteers to help us collect their driving data. Each of them drove for over three weeks. Among them, three people were driving the same car, and the others were driving different cars. They all drove in campus and on city roads including all common scenes which the driver will often come into such as turning left/right/around, uphill/downhill, changing lanes, start up/pull up and so on.
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The privacy protection model proposed in this paper is a kind of flexible method based on the privacy sensitivity levels defined by the user's own psychological degree of data privacy leakage. This mechanism can not only protect the user's data privacy according to the user's psychology, but also can realize the identification in the group intelligence tasks, and promote the task to complete efficiently.
In this system, the amount of data is dynamically updated. It will continue to increase as the task continues. For the differential privacy protection of continuous data release, there are two main problems: First, the allocation of privacy protection budget. Most of the existing mechanisms need to predefine the number of releases and then assign the privacy budget. When the data continues to be updated, the budget will be exhausted and the release mechanism will turn invalid. Second, the amount of added noise is big. Since each updated dataset needs to be processed, the final total dataset will contain the added noise each time it is processed, resulting in low data quality.
B. EVALUATION OF PRIVACY PROTECTION
We now divide the total time of the sensing task into 30 time regions as t 1 , t 2 . . . t 30 . Divide the user's privacy sensitivity into 9 levels, increasing the privacy sensitivity from 0 to 9. We let volunteers to define their own data privacy sensitivity about all the attributes of data and a privacy sensitivity as threshold T to show their tolerant of privacy leaking. FIGURE 2 shows the data privacy sensitivity of the three data sets varies with the change in the time regions of a volunteer with threshold T = 5. The three kinds of data sets are (1) the original data sensed during the task; (2) the selected data that user choose after completing a time region task; (3) the selected data that user choose and be analyzed the privacy sensitivity and processed with differential privacy. We can see that if the whole sensed data not be selected and be uploaded to the server, the original data has a quite high sensitivity level and leaks much privacy with the time regions adding. If the original data selected by the user but not be protect with differential protection, the data with high privacy sensitivity will remain in the database and send to the server. The privacy leaking of the selected data is little higher than the threshold T. If the selected data be processed with differential protection, the privacy leaking is controlled under T .
We analyze the number of people required to participate in the first few time regions and to predict the number of people required to complete the task in each time region to analyze the overhead of the task. The amount of information that is analyzed from the data set is different for the privacy sensitivity of the data uploaded by the user to the server. The higher the privacy sensitivity of a single user's uploaded data, the less information it will get from the data set. In order to achieve the purpose of completing the whole task. The accumulation of the total amount of information get from the data set has to meet the requirement. The less the information, the more users need to participate in the specified task time. As FIGURE 3 showed, the three kinds of data sets need different numbers of participants.
C. EVALUATION OF IDENTIFICATION
We choose 7 volunteers' driving data and analyze their identities using the two-layer artificial neural network model. To begin with, we use the original data sensed during the task to identify. Drivers' operations are different from each other, operations recognized correctly can related to specific drivers.
Firstly, we conduct the evaluation of the accuracy of the basic action recognition and record the characteristics in order to facilitate the subsequent identification work. The results show that just using the simplest method can also achieve the excellent accuracy of the basic action recognition.
Next, we apply the two-layer of neural network model to driver identification. We repeat the experiment 1000 times on datasets consisting of 38972 segments which are labeled with the driver IDs. We use cross-validation method, which randomly divides 80% data of each person as training set and 20% data as test set. The final result is the sum of all experiments. Results are illustrated in TABLE II. It shows that our method has nice precision, recall and F1-measure performance.
Then we further compare it with other common machine learning algorithms including random forest, SVM, k-NN. The last four rows in TABLE II show the comparison of total precision, recall and F1-measure results among these algorithms. Obviously, it performs much better than other algorithms do. Finally, we want to know how long a person drives can get the satisfactory accuracy. We invite driver 2, 3, 4 again to drive 20 times the 10km-trips for each of them. Driver 2 is told to drive on the city high way and avenue, which has few operations. Driver 4 is told to drive on the campus of Wuhan University, which has many turns, slopes and people. And Driver 3 is told to drive on the normal city road. FIGURE 4 shows the result of average accuracy for the three drivers. All the drivers' identification accuracy raises with the mileage in FIGURE 4 (a), but the increasing speed is different. As it is shown in FIGURE 4 (b), the real factor that influences the accuracy is the number of operations and scene categories, the more operations and scene categories are recognized, the higher the accuracy will be. Normally, about 6km distance trip can get the satisfactory result.
Then, we evaluate the completion of task, which means we have to check whether the drivers have already completed all driving operations as required. The driving operations include start-up, turning left, turning right, turning around, going uphill, going downhill, changing lanes and pulling up 8 categories in total. We use a method which is similar to string matching to recognize each basic actions sequence comparing to the standard operation library. To get the ''standard answer'', we choose a small part of the basic action sequences and manually divide them into 624 operations which are annotated with label. FIGURE 5 is one of the examples of the automatic segmentation by our system, and TABLE III is the result of operation classification. In this experiment, a correct fuzzy division doesn't require the start point and end point to be the exact same as manual segmentation. It allows +10% deviations. In fact, what we really care about is whether the operation is recognized and correctly recognized or not. As expected, most of the operations can be recognized correctly and related to specific drivers, which proves the validity of the method.
Then we change the selected data that user choose to upload after completing a time region task and analyze the privacy sensitivity and deal with differential privacy. And we use the data to do the all same experiments. TABLE IV is the results of driver identification. It shows that the selected data can also recognize the operations and identify drivers' IDs.
Further, we apply this mechanism to recognize drivers' emotion [29] . We hope our work can not recognize the drivers' emotion which could be seen as a specific privacy. Drivers' emotion can be divided into four kinds: relaxed, calm, nervous, angry. We use the two-layer artificial neural network model too to recognize drivers' emotion. TABLE V shows that ''relaxed'' and ''calm'' can be confused to some extent and can also be recognized as ''nervous'' or ''angry'' in a low probability. As for ''nervous'' and ''angry'', the results are similar. We can confuse the results so that the driver's emotions cannot be accurately recognized. FIGURE 6 is the relationship between the amount of noise and the right recognition rate of identification and the wrong recognition rate of emotion recognition. The noise is the amount of interference in differential privacy. The total amount of noise is divided into 10. We used the two-layer artificial neural network model and repeated the experiments. The results show that it can make the wrong rate of driver's emotion recognition to more than 75%, and keep the identification rate up to 65%. And as it is shown in the FIGURE 6, when the amount of noise added up to 9, the wrong rate of driver's emotion recognition is about 65% and the right recognition rate of identification is about 83%. We take this as the best effect in this experience.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a privacy-preserving identification mechanism for mobile sensing systems, which can not only protect participants' privacy, but also recognize participants' identities to ensure data trustworthy. The mechanism is based on trusted computing. We design an algorithm to divide data privacy sensitivity and set specific levels to quantify the sensitivity of privacy and assess the degree of privacy leaking. With differential privacy, the mechanism controls the amount of added noise and protects the data which attributes have high data sensitivity. Then the server uses a two-layer neural network model to identify participants' IDs. The experiments and data analysis in our driver sensing task prove the effectiveness of our mechanism in both privacy preserving and identification.
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